First, the argument of "good jihad" raises the question of how there can be a legitimate concept of religious war in the twenty-first century to start with. Jihad historically was as "good" as any other religious war over the last 2,000 years. If a "good jihad" is the one authorized by a caliph and directed under his auspices, then other world leaders also can wage a "good crusade" at will, as long as it is licensed by the proper authority. But in fact, all religious wars are proscribed by international law, period.

Second, the authors of this lobbyist-concocted theory claim that a wrong jihad is called a Hiraba. But in Arab Muslim history, a Hiraba (unauthorized warring) was when a group of warriors launched itself against the enemy without orders from the real commander. Obviously, this implies that a "genuine" war against a real enemy does exist and that these hotheaded soldiers have simply acted without orders. Hence this cunning explanation puts "spin" on jihad but leaves the core idea of jihadism completely intact. The "spoilers" depart from the plan, attack prematurely, and cause damage to the caliphate's long-terms plans. These Mufsidoon "fail" their commanders by unleashing a war of their own, instead of waiting for orders.

This scenario fits the relations of the global jihadists, who are the regimes and international groups slowly planning to gain power against the infidels and the "hotheaded" Osama bin Laden. Thus the promoters of this theory of Hiraba and Mufsidoon are representing the views of classical Wahabis and the Muslim Brotherhood in their criticism of the "great leap forward" made by bin Laden. But by convincing Westerners that al Qaeda and its allies are not the real jihadists but some renegades, the advocates of this school would be causing the vision of Western defense to become blurred again so that more time could be gained by a larger, more powerful wave of Jihadism that is biding its time to strike when it chooses, under a coherent international leadership.

Still, the administration's answer to this "clear and present danger" is to send more aid to Musharraf and trust that he will take care of our problem for us. We are still farming out the battle to Muslim generals who in spite of the diplomatic rhetoric and posturing clearly do not have our best interests at heart.

The strategy is at odds with the Bush doctrine of preemption. The head of the CIA has now verified that at least a remote part of Pakistan -- essentially a break-away Islamic province -- is harboring America's Enemy No. 1 and presenting a direct and urgent threat to the homeland.

Instead of carpet-bombing the terror camps and safe houses there (as opposed to the occasional drone-fired missile), we're playing a dangerous game of wait-and-see. If we have intelligence specific enough to know the type of terrorists al-Qaida's training along the Pakistan border, why aren't we acting on it?

This business about Pakistan being our ally is abject nonsense. Most of the country despises us. Musharraf and some of the military have been a fickle ally but they did at least occasionally take the fight to al Qaeda and the Taliban. They didn't do it with abandon, though, precisely because (a) the people of Pakistan oppose it(they are fine with having anti-Western jihadists operating from safe-havens within their country), and (b) Pakistan has always been a strong supporter of the Taliban (which Benazir Bhutto was key to establishing in Afghanistan) for both cultural and geopolitical reasons.

If the rationale for continuing American combat operations in Iraq is, principally, that we cannot allow anti-Western radicals to establish a platform from which they can launch 9/11-style operations, how can we conceivably turn a blind eye to the platform they have in fact established in Pakistan's border region? Try as it might, international law has not (yet) repealed the sovereign right of self-defense. We are not required by anything so vapid as "our standing in the world" to tolerate an al Qaedastan in Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, or anyplace else.

The Taliban and al Qaeda seem to have a more consistent strategy than does the Musharraf government, the Bush administration, or NATO, and a growing stronghold in the tribal areas. Indeed, it is an increasingly open question whether Pakistan's preferred strategy for the tribal regions can produce a competent protect-the-people counterinsurgency campaign. Moreover, it's unclear that the Pakistani army--which may fear Bhutto's PPP more than Mehsud's forces--even wishes to learn the demanding arts of counterinsurgency. And finally, it's far from clear that American policy, driven by a too-often-mindless quest for "stability," and content to sell F-16 fighters, air-to-air missiles, and other high-priced baubles to Pakistan in place of the kinds of gear and training needed to address the threat, can stop acting as a enabler for the Pakistani Army's worst instincts.