
William Lynd is scheduled to be executed for murder.
Does the death penalty make us safe?
If all goes as planned, Georgia will execute William Lynd tonight for the crime of killing his girlfriend in 1988.

William Lynd is scheduled to be executed for murder.
If all goes as planned, Georgia will execute William Lynd tonight for the crime of killing his girlfriend in 1988.
Retribution is the goal of restoring the scales of moral justice to balance as possible.
What, then, is the proper retribution for murder? As death penalty opponents are so fond of saying, “Executing the murderer will not bring his victim back to life.” That, of course, is true. It’s just as true, however, that giving him LIPWTPP will also fail to accomplish a resurrection. And that’s the point. There is simply nothing the murderer can do to truly restore the social fabric to the status quo ante for the obvious reason that there is no way to replace missing people. Nonetheless, as history and the Bible so clearly have held, blood alone can atone for shed blood. By requiring his life of him, we make him pay the only correct price and force him to fully pay it. This balances both the moral fabric as well as the murderer’s personal register.
Once we comprehend this distinction between murder and all other crimes (which can be restituted for), it should be clear that retribution not only justifies execution, it requires it. Execution is the only correct penalty-in-kind for murder, and retribution is the only value so far analyzed which justifies taking this most precious of payments from someone.
With several more executions lined up in death-penalty states across the country, it is important to once again focus the debate on the stark reality that the death penalty extinguishes the lives of breathing, joking, flawed and thoroughly human beings. Even if the means of taking those lives were as gentle as touching the forehead of the condemned, the ultimate challenge to our humanity would be just as vivid as a gallows, a guillotine or a firing squad.
Methods of execution that force us to confront the brutality of what we are doing more honestly express both society's rage against crime and the brutality of its consequences. For instance, there was the misery of Allen Lee "Tiny" Davis's execution in a Florida electric chair, when blood poured from his head and his contorted face could be seen through the poorly fitted mask as he struggled to stay alive, breathing ten breaths after the electricity stopped. Or the flames that sometimes shoot from the orifices of people in the electric chair. Or the extended "cut down" procedures necessary for inmates with bad veins who are being killed by lethal injection. Or the humiliating bowel releases of people hanged in the public square.
As our country resumes executions following the Baze decision, we must be mindful of the fact that extinguishing the life of a healthy person who wants to live cannot be done without violence. Whether William Lynd is led kicking and screaming to the gallows in a public square or goes to his death quietly, without any expression of pain as he succumbs to the poison flowing unseen in his bloodstream--he has not died peacefully. And we should know that--no matter the manner of execution--he never will.


The court heard arguments on the lethal injection case in January.
The Supreme Court today upheld the three-drug lethal injection method used by the state of Kentucky in a 7-2 decision, clearing the way for an unofficial moratorium on executions to be lifted.
Justice Thomas thinks it's "obvious" that death penalty opponents will do what they can to obstruct the death penalty, which makes it important to establish a "bright-line rule" that will spare the states the pain of further litigation. But the Court has denied the states this mercy: "(T)oday’s decision is sure to engender more litigation. At what point does a risk become 'substantial'? Which alternative procedures are 'feasible' and 'readily implemented'? When is a reduction in risk 'significant'? What penological justifications are 'legitimate'? Such are the questions the lower courts will have to grapple with in the wake of today’s decision."
Justice Stevens concurs. Noting that the case today does not foreclose further litigation of the issue, he gives the states some advice: consider ending the use of the paralyzing drug (pancuronium bromide). The Court won't find its use unconstitutional, but the states might be well-advised to end it on their own.
Stevens also writes at length to take the position that the death penalty itself -- because of its "negligible returns to the State" -- is "patently excessive and cruel and unusual" in violation of the 8th Amendment. This, as Justice Scalia puts it in his separate opinion, "repudiates (Justice Stevens') prior view and ... adopts the astounding position that a criminal sanction expressly mentioned in the Constitution violates the Constitution."
Kentucky and most of the other states with the death penalty use a three-step process to administer a so-called lethal injection. First, an inmate is injected with a barbiturate general anesthetic that essentially renders him unconscious; if administered correctly and in the right dose, this drug should prevent the inmate from feeling pain. A second drug is then administered to paralyze the inmate; this drug is meant to prevent disturbing muscle spasms that sometimes accompany death. The third drug stops the heart and causes excruciating burning sensations. The most significant problem with this lethal cocktail is that because the second drug paralyzes the inmate and prevents him from reacting, there is no way to know whether he feels pain from the injection of the third and lethal drug.
Medical monitoring of the inmate could help prevent administration of the heart-stopping drug unless the inmate is unconscious and unable to feel pain. But the plaintiffs offered an even simpler alternative: administer a lethal overdose of the barbiturate general anesthetic, which would render the inmate unconscious and stop his breathing. States should not rely on a flawed execution method that carries the unnecessary risk of pain when a more humane alternative is available.
