U.S. soldiers salute a fallen comrade at Fort Riley.
In an effort to encourage troops to seek psychiatric counseling for combat stress, the U.S. military announced Thursday it will no longer consider such treatment when issuing security clearances. The U.S.
Jules wanted to know where the reports are the show all of the veterans who either do not suffer the after effects or that go on to cope with their symptoms, living productive, fairly normal lives. Well, if we reverse this study information on the fact sheet, if 18% develop PTS or the more chronic PTSD, that means at least 82% of all troops come home to healthy, productive lives. With over 1 million already having served in Iraq and Afghanistan, that's approximately 820,000 troops. With 11% of the 18% that goes on to have the more chronic "disorder", that means another 70,000 who have the "acute", short term PTS and go on to live fairly healthy lives.
That is good news. Especially for our troops who may be concerned that they will be part of some overwhelming number of troops who will not be able to return to "normal". However, that's really not the point. These troops, by and far, do not need our "defense". They know they are fine and going on with their lives.
There are still 11%, over 110, 000 troops, who will struggle with PTSD. Some of the 70,000 with the "acute" variety, will not receive treatment, will stop treatment or will refuse treatment and may go on to develop the chronic disorder. Then, there are the unknown numbers who will not report any symptoms, not seek treatment and be below the radar, with both soldier and family suffering. These are the people that we need to worry about, that we need to "defend".
Last year, some 67,000 soldiers returned from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan were treated for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Eighty-nine of them committed suicide. Perhaps even more than physical injuries, mental trauma incurred by servicemen tends to have an insidious ripple effect on the affected families and communities. Numerous studies suggest that domestic violence, child abuse, drug and alcohol abuse and other destructive behavior is a regular byproduct of untreated PTSD.
Making matters worse, as Joshua Kors reported in an award-winning Nation expose published in March of 2007, there have been numerous cases in which soldiers wounded in Iraq were suspiciously diagnosed by the military as having a personality disorder, then prevented from collecting benefits which made it virtually impossible for them to treat their PTSD. (As Kors noted, the conditions of their discharge have infuriated many in the military community, including the injured soldiers and their families, veterans' rights groups, even military officials required to process these dismissals.)
The Veterans' Mental Health Outreach and Access Act of 2007, S. 38, headed soon to the Senate floor for a vote, would seek to address the metastasizing problems of returning vet's PTSD.
Is the United States still looking for this man?
More than six years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States still does not have a coherent plan to destroy a key staging area for terrorist attacks into the country, according to an independent government watchdog.
Still, the administration's answer to this "clear and present danger" is to send more aid to Musharraf and trust that he will take care of our problem for us. We are still farming out the battle to Muslim generals who in spite of the diplomatic rhetoric and posturing clearly do not have our best interests at heart.
The strategy is at odds with the Bush doctrine of preemption. The head of the CIA has now verified that at least a remote part of Pakistan -- essentially a break-away Islamic province -- is harboring America's Enemy No. 1 and presenting a direct and urgent threat to the homeland.
Instead of carpet-bombing the terror camps and safe houses there (as opposed to the occasional drone-fired missile), we're playing a dangerous game of wait-and-see. If we have intelligence specific enough to know the type of terrorists al-Qaida's training along the Pakistan border, why aren't we acting on it?
This GAO report may be the most damning condemnation of the Bush administration's counter-terrorism efforts. The report goes on to say that the Bush administration has failed to develop any plan to address the Al Qaeda threat. Worse, the report finds that Al-Qaeda is now able to attack the United States and represents the "most serious" threat to this country.
The report's opinion of the Bush administration efforts speaks for itself. Not only have we not met our goals but we have no plan to meet our goals. Al-Qaeda can now attack the United States. Al Qaeda in Pakistan is the most serious threat. Al-Qaeda is using the Pakistan tribal areas to put the finishing touches on its plans to attack the United States.
It is really not a good thing to have incompetent people running this country.
Pakistanis express anger at the U.S.
CIA Director Michael Hayden has publicly confirmed what was already known -- that Al Qaeda has found a safe haven in Pakistan, along the rugged border with Afghanistan. He said the haven is a "clear and present danger" to America.
This business about Pakistan being our ally is abject nonsense. Most of the country despises us. Musharraf and some of the military have been a fickle ally but they did at least occasionally take the fight to al Qaeda and the Taliban. They didn't do it with abandon, though, precisely because (a) the people of Pakistan oppose it(they are fine with having anti-Western jihadists operating from safe-havens within their country), and (b) Pakistan has always been a strong supporter of the Taliban (which Benazir Bhutto was key to establishing in Afghanistan) for both cultural and geopolitical reasons.
If the rationale for continuing American combat operations in Iraq is, principally, that we cannot allow anti-Western radicals to establish a platform from which they can launch 9/11-style operations, how can we conceivably turn a blind eye to the platform they have in fact established in Pakistan's border region? Try as it might, international law has not (yet) repealed the sovereign right of self-defense. We are not required by anything so vapid as "our standing in the world" to tolerate an al Qaedastan in Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, or anyplace else.
The majority of Pakistanis recognize that militancy is a major problem. A recent spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan's cities has brought that reality home. Meanwhile, the most extreme Islamic parties took the biggest hit in the February elections. However, says former Ambassador Schaffer, "that doesn't mean we all agree on what needs to be done." Dealing with a complex coalition will be a lot harder than negotiating with a military dictator. For the past six years, the U.S. tied Pakistan's cooperation in targeting high level Al Qaeda operatives and shutting down militant training camps to a $10 billion package of military and economic aid. The new coalition government might take a different tack on U.S. handouts. Sharif has said that Pakistan should rely less on such U.S. assistance.
Prime Minister Gilani promised this week to confront terrorism "with determination." But when it comes to U.S. cooperation, Gillani told the high-level State Department delegation, "all important policy matters and decisions on important national issues would be taken through the parliament." Not the Pentagon.
U.S. soldiers emerge from cover in Iraq.
Behind the Pentagon's closed doors, U.S. military leaders told President Bush Wednesday they are worried about the Iraq war's mounting strain on troops and their families. But they indicated they'd go along with a brief halt in pulling out troops this summer. The chiefs' concern is that U.S.
Have American forces been strengthened or broken by the War on Terror campaigns?
The Small Wars Journal summarizes a Center for a New American Security and Foreign Policy survey of more than active service and retired 3,000 officers with the rank of major and above across the services, 2/3 of whom had combat experience. According to the survey's website "The nonscientific survey was administered online from December 7, 2007, to January 15, 2008."
Interestingly the biggest identified constraint in prosecuting the War on Terror isn't the size of the Armed Forces, though that is certainly one of the respondent's top priorities. It's getting good intelligence, a desire supported by the sizeable number of respondents who thought it was a good idea to "increase the number of troops with foreign language skills."
Perhaps the most significant piece of long-term strategic data was where the respondents thought the increase in strength was going to come from. From the response they had all but counted out expecting reinforcements from the national elites.
Today's Army is stretched past its breaking point by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sounds of its collapse may be faint enough for policymakers in Washington to ignore, but they are there. An exodus of junior and midlevel personnel illustrates the crisis. Their exit has forced the Army to apply tourniquets like "stop loss" to halt the hemorrhaging, and it has also dropped its standards for recruiting and retention.
Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., has said that the only thing worse than a broken army is a defeated army. But this puts the cart before the horse, because in this case, the breaking of America's military will lead to defeat, both now and later. America cannot afford to send untrained, unready, or distracted troops into complex conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Adm. William J. Fallon is resigning.
The Navy admiral in charge of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan announced Tuesday that he is resigning over an Esquire article portraying him as opposed to President Bush's Iran policy. Adm. William J. Fallon, one of the most experienced officers in the U.S.
It's more likely that Fallon is an indirect casualty of the Surge. The Admiral was appointed at a time when it was widely believed the US had been balked in Iraq and reflected the cautious mood of those days. But now the US has much more confidence in its regional position at a time when dangers have also been increasing. Therefore Fallon's departure may simply reflect that more aggressive position. But a more aggressive stance doesn't automatically equal a war against Iran.
By all accounts, the points of contention between Fallon and Bush administration officials centered on three points: 1) his belief that the indefinite occupation of Iraq is a disaster for the US military, 2) that diplomacy has a central role in American foreign and national security policy, 3) that war is not a credible policy for the US to pursue in dealing with Iran. The last of these was believed to be the key issue.
It is widely believed in media and political circles that despite the difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, American foreign policy is back under some kind of adult/mainstream management. In other words, that we've left the Cheney/Rumsfeld era behind for a period of Gates/Rice normalcy and that Iran regime change adventurism is safely off the table. But put together what the disagreements with Fallon were about, the fact that the president chose him as someone he thought he could work with not more than one year ago, and the almost unprecedented nature of the resignation and it becomes clear that that assumption must be gravely in error.
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