Breaking the Army in Iraq

The New York Times reminds us today that the Army is in danger of cracking up over the strain of the Iraq war.

The Army study of mental health showed that 27 percent of noncommissioned officers — a critically important group — on their third or fourth tour exhibited symptoms commonly referred to as post-traumatic stress disorders. That figure is far higher than the roughly 12 percent who exhibit those symptoms after one tour and the 18.5 percent who develop the disorders after a second deployment, according to the study, which was conducted by the Army surgeon general’s Mental Health Advisory Team.

Senior officers warn that time at home must be increased from the current 12 months between combat tours. Otherwise, they say, the ground forces risk an unacceptable level of retirements of sergeants — the key leaders of the small-unit operations — and of experienced captains, who represent the future of the Army’s officer corps.

I have to admit, my first thought upon reading this was: "I wonder if Gen. Omar Bradley ever asked Franklin Roosevelt to ease up on the war against the Germans and the Japanese to preserve the mental health of the Army." My guess: No.

Then again, World War II can plausibly be depicted as a war for national survival -- Bradley and Roosevelt were on the same page about that. By raising their concerns so publicly now, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are signalling that they see Iraq as anything but -- and that they increasingly see our committment there as not being worth the cost we're paying. Not that they'd ever say it like that, of course -- they properly defer to the civilian commander-in-chief in the setting of national priorities. But how else can you interpret these warnings?

“Our readiness is being consumed as fast as we build it,” Gen. Richard A. Cody, the Army vice chief of staff, said in stark comments delivered to Congress last week. “Lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time have placed incredible stress on our soldiers and our families, testing the resolve of our all-volunteer force like never before.”

The danger here goes beyond the Army's capabilities, because it reveals some important problems:

* There's a disconnect between the Bush Administration and the military's senior commanders over the importance of Iraq. That's troubling.

* There's a disconnect between the president's rhetoric about the war and his actions. If Iraq were that important, President Bush wouldn't just be "surging" troops there: He'd be raising all-new brigades and divisions to ensure that America could more than meet the challenges offered by Iraq or any other potential adversary. There's been a slow and small increase in the size of the Army, but it's clearly not been enough. He either doesn't think it's important enough, or he doesn't think he could muster the political support -- in which case, he doesn't think it's important enough.

And that's a good sign that it is time to leave.